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111 lines
7.9 KiB
111 lines
7.9 KiB
Security
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==
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## Glossary
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- **CORS** - Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS).
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- **CSRF** - Cross-Site request forgery (CSRF) is an attack that forces an end user to execute unwanted actions on a web application in which they're currently authenticated.
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- **XSS** - Cross-site scripting (XSS).
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## CORS
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The same-origin policy protects users by disallowing websites to retrieve information from other websites of different origins. An origin is the triple {protocol, host, port}. Two resources are considered to be of the same origin if and only if all these values are exactly the same.
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Cross-Origin Resource Sharing allows relaxing of the same-origin policy. CORS defines a way in which a browser and server can interact to determine whether or not it is safe to allow the cross-origin request.
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This standard extends HTTP with a new `Origin` request header and `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` and `Access-Control-Allow-Methods` response headers. It allows servers to use a header to explicitly list origins and HTTP methods that may request a file or to use a wildcard and allow a file to be requested by any site. `XMLHttpRequest`s to a target origin from a different source origin will be blocked if the server did not allow CORS for source origin.
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## CSRF
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XSS vulnerabilities allow attackers to bypass essentially all CSRF preventions.
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#### Protection
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- Verifying Same Origin with Standard Headers
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- There are two steps to this check:
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1. Determining the origin the request is coming from (source origin).
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2. Determining the origin the request is going to (target origin).
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- Examine the `Origin`, `Referer` and `Host` Header values.
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- Synchronizer Tokens
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- The CSRF token is added as a hidden field for forms or within the URL.
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- Characteristics of a CSRF Token
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- Unique per user session
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- Large random value
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- Generated by a cryptographically secure random number generator
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- The server rejects the requested action if the CSRF token fails validation.
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- Double Cookie
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- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a (cryptographically strong) pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user's machine. The site should require every form submission to include this pseudorandom value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same. When an attacker submits a form on behalf of a user, he can only modify the values of the form. An attacker cannot read any data sent from the server or modify cookie values, per the same-origin policy. This means that while an attacker can send any value he wants with the form, he will be unable to modify or read the value stored in the cookie. Since the cookie value and the form value must be the same, the attacker will be unable to successfully submit a form unless he is able to guess the pseudorandom value.
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- The advantage of this approach is that it requires no server state; you simply set the cookie value once, then every HTTP POST checks to ensure that one of the submitted <input> values contains the exact same cookie value. Any difference between the two means a possible XSRF attack.
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- Cookie-to-Header Token
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- On login, the web application sets a cookie containing a random token that remains the same for the whole user session
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- `Set-Cookie: Csrf-token=i8XNjC4b8KVok4uw5RftR38Wgp2BFwql; expires=Thu, 23-Jul-2015 10:25:33 GMT; Max-Age=31449600; Path=/`
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- JavaScript operating on the client side reads its value and copies it into a custom HTTP header sent with each transactional request
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- `X-Csrf-Token: i8XNjC4b8KVok4uw5RftR38Wgp2BFwql`
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- The server validates presence and integrity of the token.
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- Security of this technique is based on the assumption that only JavaScript running within the same origin will be able to read the cookie's value.
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- JavaScript running from a rogue file or email will not be able to read it and copy into the custom header. Even though the `csrf-token` cookie will be automatically sent with the rogue request, the server will be still expecting a valid `X-Csrf-Token` header.
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- Use of Custom Request Headers
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- An alternate defense which is particularly well suited for AJAX endpoints is the use of a custom request header. This defense relies on the same-origin policy (SOP) restriction that only JavaScript can be used to add a custom header, and only within its origin. By default, browsers don't allow JavaScript to make cross origin requests. Such a header can be `X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest`.
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- If this is the case for your system, you can simply verify the presence of this header and value on all your server side AJAX endpoints in order to protect against CSRF attacks. This approach has the double advantage of usually requiring no UI changes and not introducing any server side state, which is particularly attractive to REST services. You can always add your own custom header and value if that is preferred.
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- Require user interaction
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- Require a re-authentication, using a one-time token, or requiring users to complete a captcha.
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###### References
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- [OWASP CSRF](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_(CSRF))
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## HTTPS
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HTTPS is HTTP over SSL/TLS. Servers and clients still speak exactly the same HTTP to each other, but over a secure SSL connection that encrypts and decrypts their requests and responses. The SSL layer has 2 main purposes:
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1. Verifying that you are talking directly to the server that you think you are talking to.
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1. Ensuring that only the server can read what you send it and only you can read what it sends back.
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#### TLS Handshake
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// TODO. Crosscheck and add in more details.
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1. The client computer sends a `ClientHello` message to the server with its Transport Layer Security (TLS) version, list of cipher algorithms and compression methods available.
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1. The server replies with a `ServerHello` message to the client with the TLS version, selected cipher, selected compression methods and the server's public certificate signed by a CA (Certificate Authority). The certificate contains a public key that will be used by the client to encrypt the rest of the handshake until a symmetric key can be agreed upon.
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1. The client verifies the server digital certificate against its list of trusted CAs. If trust can be established based on the CA, the client generates a string of pseudo-random bytes and encrypts this with the server's public key. These random bytes can be used to determine the symmetric key.
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1. The server decrypts the random bytes using its private key and uses these bytes to generate its own copy of the symmetric master key.
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1. The client sends a `Finished` message to the server, encrypting a hash of the transmission up to this point with the symmetric key.
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1. The server generates its own hash, and then decrypts the client-sent hash to verify that it matches. If it does, it sends its own `Finished` message to the client, also encrypted with the symmetric key.
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1. From now on the TLS session transmits the application (HTTP) data encrypted with the agreed symmetric key.
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#### Downsides of HTTPS
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- TLS handshake computational and latency overhead.
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- Encryption and decryption requires more computation power and bandwidth.
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###### References
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- https://blog.hartleybrody.com/https-certificates/
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- https://github.com/alex/what-happens-when#tls-handshake
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- http://robertheaton.com/2014/03/27/how-does-https-actually-work/
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## XSS
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XSS vulnerabilities allow attackers to bypass essentially all CSRF preventions.
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```js
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const name = "<img src='x' onerror='alert(1)'>";
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el.innerHTML = name;
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```
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http://shebang.brandonmintern.com/foolproof-html-escaping-in-javascript/
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## Session hijacking
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- https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Cookies
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- https://www.nczonline.net/blog/2009/05/12/cookies-and-security/
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## Framebusting
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https://seclab.stanford.edu/websec/framebusting/framebust.pdf
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## API
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https://github.com/shieldfy/API-Security-Checklist
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