diff --git a/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema.go b/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema.go
index 63ca0c274..2dea57230 100644
--- a/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema.go
+++ b/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema.go
@@ -136,11 +136,14 @@ func ValidateAgainstSingleSchema(values common.Values, schemaJSON []byte) (reter
 	}
 	slog.Debug("unmarshalled JSON schema", "schema", schemaJSON)
 
-	// Configure compiler with loaders for different URL schemes
+	// Refuse external schema references (http(s):// and file://) instead of
+	// fetching them; see denyURLLoader. The urn scheme stays resolvable via the
+	// pluggable URNResolver for back-compatibility.
+	deny := denyURLLoader{}
 	loader := jsonschema.SchemeURLLoader{
-		"file":  jsonschema.FileLoader{},
-		"http":  newHTTPURLLoader(),
-		"https": newHTTPURLLoader(),
+		"file":  deny,
+		"http":  deny,
+		"https": deny,
 		"urn":   urnLoader{},
 	}
 
@@ -164,6 +167,28 @@ func ValidateAgainstSingleSchema(values common.Values, schemaJSON []byte) (reter
 	return nil
 }
 
+// denyURLLoader is a [jsonschema.URLLoader] that refuses to resolve any
+// external schema reference.
+//
+// A chart's values.schema.json is untrusted input (loaded verbatim from a chart
+// archive that may originate from a remote repository or OCI registry). If the
+// JSON Schema compiler is allowed to follow external "$ref"/"$id"/"$schema"
+// references, a malicious chart can drive Helm into fetching attacker-chosen
+// URLs while validating values: "http(s)://" references become a server-side
+// request forgery primitive (e.g. against cloud-metadata endpoints) and
+// "file://" references read arbitrary local files into the schema graph - the
+// JSON Schema analogue of an XXE attack.
+//
+// Standard meta-schemas (the json-schema.org drafts named by "$schema") are
+// served by the compiler from an embedded copy and never reach a loader, so
+// failing closed here keeps schema validation a purely local, in-archive
+// operation without breaking legitimate charts.
+type denyURLLoader struct{}
+
+func (denyURLLoader) Load(url string) (any, error) {
+	return nil, fmt.Errorf("loading external schema reference %q is not allowed", url)
+}
+
 // URNResolverFunc allows SDK to plug a URN resolver. It must return a
 // schema document compatible with the validator (e.g., result of
 // jsonschema.UnmarshalJSON).
diff --git a/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema_test.go b/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema_test.go
index 838d152a1..b980221ea 100644
--- a/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema_test.go
+++ b/pkg/chart/common/util/jsonschema_test.go
@@ -17,10 +17,13 @@ limitations under the License.
 package util
 
 import (
+	"fmt"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
+	"sync/atomic"
 	"testing"
 
 	"helm.sh/helm/v4/pkg/chart/common"
@@ -300,6 +303,46 @@ func TestValidateAgainstSingleSchema_UnresolvedURN_Ignored(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestValidateAgainstSingleSchema_ExternalRefDenied ensures that external schema
+// references in an (untrusted) chart schema are refused rather than resolved,
+// closing the SSRF / arbitrary-local-file-read vector. See denyURLLoader.
+func TestValidateAgainstSingleSchema_ExternalRefDenied(t *testing.T) {
+	// An http:// $ref must fail closed and must not trigger an outbound request.
+	t.Run("http ref is not fetched (SSRF)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		var hits int32
+		server := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, _ *http.Request) {
+			atomic.AddInt32(&hits, 1)
+			w.Write([]byte(`{"type": "object"}`))
+		}))
+		defer server.Close()
+
+		schema := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"$ref": %q}`, server.URL+"/evil.json"))
+		err := ValidateAgainstSingleSchema(common.Values{"any": "value"}, schema)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("expected validation to fail closed on an external http $ref")
+		}
+		if got := atomic.LoadInt32(&hits); got != 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("external $ref was fetched: server was contacted %d time(s)", got)
+		}
+	})
+
+	// A file:// $ref must fail closed and must not read local file contents.
+	t.Run("file ref is not read", func(t *testing.T) {
+		secret := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "secret.txt")
+		if err := os.WriteFile(secret, []byte("TOP-SECRET"), 0o600); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+		schema := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(`{"$ref": %q}`, "file:///"+filepath.ToSlash(secret)))
+		err := ValidateAgainstSingleSchema(common.Values{"any": "value"}, schema)
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Fatal("expected validation to fail closed on an external file $ref")
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(err.Error(), "TOP-SECRET") {
+			t.Fatalf("local file content leaked through schema validation: %v", err)
+		}
+	})
+}
+
 // Non-regression tests for https://github.com/helm/helm/issues/31202
 // Ensure ValidateAgainstSchema does not panic when:
 // - subchart key is missing