You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.
cloudreve/pkg/auth/jwt.go

357 lines
10 KiB

package auth
import (
"bytes"
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/ent"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/inventory"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/cache"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/hashid"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/logging"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/serializer"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/setting"
"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/util"
"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
"github.com/gofrs/uuid"
"github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
)
type TokenAuth interface {
// Issue issues a new pair of credentials for the given user.
Issue(ctx context.Context, args *IssueTokenArgs) (*Token, error)
// VerifyAndRetrieveUser verifies the given token and inject the user into current context.
// Returns if upper caller should continue process other session provider.
VerifyAndRetrieveUser(c *gin.Context) (bool, error)
// Refresh refreshes the given refresh token and returns a new pair of credentials.
Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*Token, error)
// Claims parses the given token string and returns the claims.
Claims(ctx context.Context, tokenStr string) (*Claims, error)
}
type IssueTokenArgs struct {
User *ent.User
RootTokenID *uuid.UUID
ClientID string
Scopes []string
RefreshTTLOverride time.Duration
}
// Token stores token pair for authentication
type Token struct {
AccessToken string `json:"access_token"`
RefreshToken string `json:"refresh_token"`
AccessExpires time.Time `json:"access_expires"`
RefreshExpires time.Time `json:"refresh_expires"`
UID int `json:"-"`
}
type (
TokenType string
TokenIDContextKey struct{}
ScopeContextKey struct{}
)
var (
TokenTypeAccess = TokenType("access")
TokenTypeRefresh = TokenType("refresh")
ErrInvalidRefreshToken = errors.New("invalid refresh token")
ErrUserNotFound = errors.New("user not found")
)
const (
AuthorizationHeader = "Authorization"
TokenHeaderPrefix = "Bearer "
RevokeTokenPrefix = "jwt_revoke_"
)
type Claims struct {
TokenType TokenType `json:"token_type"`
jwt.RegisteredClaims
StateHash []byte `json:"state_hash,omitempty"`
RootTokenID *uuid.UUID `json:"root_token_id,omitempty"`
Scopes []string `json:"scopes,omitempty"`
ClientID string `json:"client_id,omitempty"`
}
// NewTokenAuth creates a new token based auth provider.
func NewTokenAuth(idEncoder hashid.Encoder, s setting.Provider, secret []byte, userClient inventory.UserClient,
l logging.Logger, kv cache.Driver, oAuthClient inventory.OAuthClientClient) TokenAuth {
return &tokenAuth{
idEncoder: idEncoder,
s: s,
secret: secret,
userClient: userClient,
l: l,
kv: kv,
oAuthClient: oAuthClient,
}
}
type tokenAuth struct {
l logging.Logger
idEncoder hashid.Encoder
s setting.Provider
secret []byte
userClient inventory.UserClient
oAuthClient inventory.OAuthClientClient
kv cache.Driver
}
func (t *tokenAuth) Claims(ctx context.Context, tokenStr string) (*Claims, error) {
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenStr, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
return t.secret, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token: %w", err)
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid token claims")
}
return claims, nil
}
func (t *tokenAuth) Refresh(ctx context.Context, refreshToken string) (*Token, error) {
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(refreshToken, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
return t.secret, nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid refresh token: %w", err)
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok || claims.TokenType != TokenTypeRefresh {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
uid, err := t.idEncoder.Decode(claims.Subject, hashid.UserID)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
expectedUser, err := t.userClient.GetActiveByID(ctx, uid)
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrUserNotFound
}
// Check if user changed password or revoked session
expectedHash := t.hashUserState(ctx, expectedUser)
if !bytes.Equal(claims.StateHash, expectedHash[:]) {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
// Check if root token is revoked
if claims.RootTokenID == nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
_, ok = t.kv.Get(fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", RevokeTokenPrefix, claims.RootTokenID.String()))
if ok {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
// If token issued for an OAuth client, check if the client is still valid
refreshTTLOverride := time.Duration(0)
if claims.ClientID != "" {
client, err := t.oAuthClient.GetByGUIDWithGrants(ctx, claims.ClientID, expectedUser.ID)
if err != nil || len(client.Edges.Grants) == 0 {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
// Consented scopes must be a subset of the client's scopes
if !ValidateScopes(claims.Scopes, client.Edges.Grants[0].Scopes) {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
// Update last used at for the grant
if err := t.oAuthClient.UpdateGrantLastUsedAt(ctx, expectedUser.ID, client.ID); err != nil {
return nil, ErrInvalidRefreshToken
}
if client.Props != nil {
refreshTTLOverride = time.Duration(client.Props.RefreshTokenTTL) * time.Second
}
}
return t.Issue(ctx, &IssueTokenArgs{
User: expectedUser,
RootTokenID: claims.RootTokenID,
Scopes: claims.Scopes,
ClientID: claims.ClientID,
RefreshTTLOverride: refreshTTLOverride,
})
}
func (t *tokenAuth) VerifyAndRetrieveUser(c *gin.Context) (bool, error) {
headerVal := c.GetHeader(AuthorizationHeader)
if strings.HasPrefix(headerVal, TokenHeaderPrefixCr) {
// This is an HMAC auth header, skip JWT verification
return false, nil
}
tokenString := strings.TrimPrefix(headerVal, TokenHeaderPrefix)
if tokenString == "" {
return true, nil
}
token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
return t.secret, nil
})
if err != nil {
t.l.Warning("Failed to parse jwt token: %s", err)
return false, nil
}
claims, ok := token.Claims.(*Claims)
if !ok || claims.TokenType != TokenTypeAccess {
return false, serializer.NewError(serializer.CodeCredentialInvalid, "Invalid token type", nil)
}
uid, err := t.idEncoder.Decode(claims.Subject, hashid.UserID)
if err != nil {
return false, serializer.NewError(serializer.CodeNotFound, "User not found", err)
}
util.WithValue(c, inventory.UserIDCtx{}, uid)
if claims.ClientID != "" {
util.WithValue(c, ScopeContextKey{}, claims.Scopes)
}
return false, nil
}
func (t *tokenAuth) Issue(ctx context.Context, args *IssueTokenArgs) (*Token, error) {
u := args.User
rootTokenID := args.RootTokenID
uidEncoded := hashid.EncodeUserID(t.idEncoder, u.ID)
tokenSettings := t.s.TokenAuth(ctx)
issueDate := time.Now()
accessTokenExpired := time.Now().Add(tokenSettings.AccessTokenTTL)
refreshTokenExpired := time.Now().Add(tokenSettings.RefreshTokenTTL)
if args.RefreshTTLOverride > 0 {
refreshTokenExpired = time.Now().Add(args.RefreshTTLOverride)
}
if rootTokenID == nil {
newRootTokenID := uuid.Must(uuid.NewV4())
rootTokenID = &newRootTokenID
}
accessToken, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, Claims{
TokenType: TokenTypeAccess,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Subject: uidEncoded,
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(issueDate),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(accessTokenExpired),
},
Scopes: args.Scopes,
}).SignedString(t.secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("faield to sign access token: %w", err)
}
userHash := t.hashUserState(ctx, u)
refreshToken, err := jwt.NewWithClaims(jwt.SigningMethodHS256, Claims{
TokenType: TokenTypeRefresh,
RootTokenID: rootTokenID,
RegisteredClaims: jwt.RegisteredClaims{
Subject: uidEncoded,
NotBefore: jwt.NewNumericDate(issueDate),
ExpiresAt: jwt.NewNumericDate(refreshTokenExpired),
},
Scopes: args.Scopes,
ClientID: args.ClientID,
StateHash: userHash[:],
}).SignedString(t.secret)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("faield to sign refresh token: %w", err)
}
return &Token{
AccessToken: accessToken,
RefreshToken: refreshToken,
AccessExpires: accessTokenExpired,
RefreshExpires: refreshTokenExpired,
UID: u.ID,
}, nil
}
// hashUserState returns a hash string for user state for critical fields, it is used
// to detect refresh token revocation after user changed password.
func (t *tokenAuth) hashUserState(ctx context.Context, u *ent.User) [32]byte {
return sha256.Sum256([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s/%s", u.Email, u.Password, t.s.SiteBasic(ctx).ID)))
}
// ValidateScopes checks if all requested scopes are a subset of the allowed scopes.
// Returns true if all requested scopes are valid, false otherwise.
func ValidateScopes(requestedScopes, allowedScopes []string) bool {
allowed := make(map[string]struct{}, len(allowedScopes))
for _, scope := range allowedScopes {
allowed[scope] = struct{}{}
}
for _, scope := range requestedScopes {
if _, ok := allowed[scope]; !ok {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func GetScopesFromContext(ctx context.Context) (bool, []string) {
scopes, ok := ctx.Value(ScopeContextKey{}).([]string)
if !ok {
return false, nil
}
return true, scopes
}
func CheckScope(c *gin.Context, requiredScopes ...string) error {
hasScopes, tokenScopes := GetScopesFromContext(c)
if !hasScopes {
return nil
}
// Build a set of token scopes including implicit read permissions from write scopes
scopeSet := make(map[string]struct{}, len(tokenScopes)*2)
for _, scope := range tokenScopes {
scopeSet[scope] = struct{}{}
// If scope is "xxx.Write", also grant "xxx.Read"
if resource, ok := extractWriteResource(scope); ok {
scopeSet[resource+".Read"] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Check if all required scopes are present
for _, required := range requiredScopes {
if _, ok := scopeSet[required]; !ok {
return serializer.NewError(serializer.CodeInsufficientScope,
"Insufficient scope: "+required, nil)
}
}
return nil
}
// extractWriteResource extracts the resource name from a write scope.
// For example, "File.Write" returns ("File", true), "File.Read" returns ("", false).
func extractWriteResource(scope string) (string, bool) {
const writeSuffix = ".Write"
if len(scope) > len(writeSuffix) && scope[len(scope)-len(writeSuffix):] == writeSuffix {
return scope[:len(scope)-len(writeSuffix)], true
}
return "", false
}