parent
ed20843dc3
commit
aaebf317a7
@ -1 +1 @@
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Subproject commit 1678ce8a748123ffc078ef958c6e68523a999128
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Subproject commit bf9c1ff7c196c6e3759bacdbf496d5dc2e2d2c35
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@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
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package request
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import (
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"context"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"net/url"
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"strings"
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)
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// ErrUnsafeURL is returned when a user-supplied URL targets an address that
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// should not be reachable by server-side fetchers (loopback, private,
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// link-local, cloud metadata, multicast, etc.) or uses a non-allowed scheme.
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var ErrUnsafeURL = errors.New("URL is not allowed")
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var downloadAllowedSchemes = map[string]struct{}{
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"http": {},
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"https": {},
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"ftp": {},
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"ftps": {},
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"sftp": {},
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"magnet": {},
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}
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// trackerAllowedSchemes are schemes valid inside magnet tr=/ws=/xs=/as= params
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// that we recognize and validate. Anything else is treated as non-network
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// (e.g. dht://) and skipped.
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var trackerAllowedSchemes = map[string]struct{}{
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"http": {},
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"https": {},
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"udp": {},
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"ws": {},
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"wss": {},
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}
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var bannedHostnames = map[string]struct{}{
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"localhost": {},
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"localhost.localdomain": {},
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"ip6-localhost": {},
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"ip6-loopback": {},
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}
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// 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC 6598 CGNAT) is not flagged by net.IP.IsPrivate.
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var cgnatNet = mustParseCIDR("100.64.0.0/10")
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// 169.254.169.254 (cloud instance metadata) is link-local and already covered
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// by IsLinkLocalUnicast, but we keep an explicit check for clarity.
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var cloudMetadataIP = net.ParseIP("169.254.169.254")
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func mustParseCIDR(s string) *net.IPNet {
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_, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(s)
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if err != nil {
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panic(err)
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}
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return n
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}
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// SSRFOptions configures ValidateExternalURL.
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type SSRFOptions struct {
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// Disabled short-circuits the entire check. Use when the operator has
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// explicitly opted out (e.g. node-level URLValidation.Disabled).
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Disabled bool
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// AllowedHosts contains hostnames whose URLs bypass all subsequent checks
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// (used to whitelist the operator-configured site URL host(s) and any
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// operator-trusted internal hostnames). Compared case-insensitively to
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// the URL's Hostname(). Port is ignored.
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AllowedHosts []string
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// AllowedCIDRs contains CIDR blocks whose IPs bypass the IP-class checks.
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// Resolved IPs falling within any of these are treated as safe even if
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// they would otherwise be rejected (private, link-local, ...). Malformed
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// entries are ignored. Used to opt a LAN range back in.
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AllowedCIDRs []string
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// Resolver is used for DNS lookups; nil uses net.DefaultResolver.
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Resolver *net.Resolver
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}
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// ValidateExternalURL returns an error wrapping ErrUnsafeURL if the URL would
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// reach an internal-only address when fetched by a server-side downloader.
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// Magnet links have their tr=/ws=/xs=/as= parameters validated as URLs.
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func ValidateExternalURL(ctx context.Context, raw string, opt SSRFOptions) error {
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if opt.Disabled {
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return nil
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}
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raw = strings.TrimSpace(raw)
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if raw == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("empty URL: %w", ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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u, err := url.Parse(raw)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("parse URL: %w", ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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scheme := strings.ToLower(u.Scheme)
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if _, ok := downloadAllowedSchemes[scheme]; !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("scheme %q not allowed: %w", u.Scheme, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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if scheme == "magnet" {
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return validateMagnet(ctx, u, opt)
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}
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return validateHost(ctx, u.Hostname(), opt)
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}
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func validateMagnet(ctx context.Context, u *url.URL, opt SSRFOptions) error {
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q := u.Query()
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for _, key := range []string{"tr", "ws", "xs", "as"} {
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for _, v := range q[key] {
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sub, err := url.Parse(strings.TrimSpace(v))
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("magnet %s=%q: %w", key, v, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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if sub.Hostname() == "" {
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continue
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}
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if _, ok := trackerAllowedSchemes[strings.ToLower(sub.Scheme)]; !ok {
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continue
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}
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if err := validateHost(ctx, sub.Hostname(), opt); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("magnet %s=%q: %w", key, v, err)
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}
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validateHost(ctx context.Context, host string, opt SSRFOptions) error {
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host = strings.TrimSpace(host)
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if host == "" {
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return fmt.Errorf("empty host: %w", ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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for _, allowed := range opt.AllowedHosts {
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if strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(allowed), host) {
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return nil
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}
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}
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lowered := strings.ToLower(host)
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if _, banned := bannedHostnames[lowered]; banned {
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return fmt.Errorf("hostname %q is local: %w", host, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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if strings.HasSuffix(lowered, ".localhost") {
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return fmt.Errorf("hostname %q is local: %w", host, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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allowed := parseCIDRs(opt.AllowedCIDRs)
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if ip := net.ParseIP(host); ip != nil {
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return checkIPWithAllowlist(ip, allowed)
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}
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resolver := opt.Resolver
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if resolver == nil {
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resolver = net.DefaultResolver
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}
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addrs, err := resolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("resolve %q: %w", host, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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if len(addrs) == 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("no addresses for %q: %w", host, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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for _, a := range addrs {
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if err := checkIPWithAllowlist(a.IP, allowed); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return nil
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}
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// parseCIDRs parses CIDR strings, silently dropping malformed entries — the
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// admin gets validation feedback at config-save time, so noisy errors during a
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// download are not useful.
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func parseCIDRs(raw []string) []*net.IPNet {
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out := make([]*net.IPNet, 0, len(raw))
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for _, r := range raw {
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_, n, err := net.ParseCIDR(strings.TrimSpace(r))
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if err == nil {
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out = append(out, n)
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}
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}
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return out
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}
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func checkIPWithAllowlist(ip net.IP, allowed []*net.IPNet) error {
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for _, n := range allowed {
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if n.Contains(ip) {
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return nil
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}
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}
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return checkIP(ip)
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}
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func checkIP(ip net.IP) error {
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if ip == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("invalid IP: %w", ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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switch {
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case ip.IsLoopback():
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return fmt.Errorf("loopback address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case ip.IsUnspecified():
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return fmt.Errorf("unspecified address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case ip.IsLinkLocalUnicast(), ip.IsLinkLocalMulticast():
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return fmt.Errorf("link-local address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case ip.IsPrivate():
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return fmt.Errorf("private address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case ip.IsMulticast():
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return fmt.Errorf("multicast address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case ip.Equal(cloudMetadataIP):
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return fmt.Errorf("cloud metadata address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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case cgnatNet.Contains(ip):
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return fmt.Errorf("CGNAT address %s: %w", ip, ErrUnsafeURL)
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}
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return nil
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}
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@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
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// Package ssrftest contains tests for pkg/request SSRF validation. It lives
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// in a separate directory so it can compile even when the parent package's
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// pre-existing _test.go files do not.
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package ssrftest
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import (
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"context"
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"testing"
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"github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4/pkg/request"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
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)
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func TestValidateExternalURL_Scheme(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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cases := []string{
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"file:///etc/passwd",
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"gopher://example.com/_GET",
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"dict://127.0.0.1:11211/stat",
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"ldap://x",
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"javascript:alert(1)",
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"",
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}
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for _, raw := range cases {
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err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, request.SSRFOptions{})
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL, "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_LocalLiterals(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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cases := []string{
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"http://localhost/x",
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"http://LOCALHOST:8080/x",
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"http://ip6-localhost/x",
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"http://service.localhost/x",
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"https://localhost.localdomain/x",
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}
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for _, raw := range cases {
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err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, request.SSRFOptions{})
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL, "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_IPLiterals(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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cases := []string{
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"http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret",
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"http://[::1]:7780/v6secret",
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"http://10.0.0.5/internal",
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"http://172.16.5.5/internal",
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"http://192.168.1.1/router",
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta",
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"http://169.254.42.42/link-local",
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"http://[fe80::1]/link-local-v6",
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"http://[fc00::1]/ula",
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"http://0.0.0.0/x",
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"http://[::]/x",
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"http://100.64.0.1/cgnat",
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"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/v4mapped",
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"http://[::ffff:10.0.0.1]/v4mappedpriv",
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"http://224.0.0.1/multicast",
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}
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for _, raw := range cases {
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err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, request.SSRFOptions{})
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL, "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_PublicIP(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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cases := []string{
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"http://1.1.1.1/",
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"https://8.8.8.8/",
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"http://[2606:4700:4700::1111]/",
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}
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for _, raw := range cases {
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err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, request.SSRFOptions{})
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assert.NoError(t, err, "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_AllowedHostBypass(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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opt := request.SSRFOptions{AllowedHosts: []string{"localhost"}}
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for _, raw := range []string{
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"http://localhost/file.zip",
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"http://LOCALHOST:8080/file.zip",
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} {
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, opt), "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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opt = request.SSRFOptions{AllowedHosts: []string{"cloudreve.example.com"}}
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, "https://cloudreve.example.com/x", opt))
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opt = request.SSRFOptions{AllowedHosts: []string{"127.0.0.1"}}
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, "http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret", opt))
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_Disabled(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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opt := request.SSRFOptions{Disabled: true}
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// Everything passes when the operator has explicitly disabled validation.
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for _, raw := range []string{
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"http://127.0.0.1:7777/secret",
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"http://localhost/x",
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"file:///etc/passwd",
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest",
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} {
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, raw, opt), "raw=%q", raw)
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}
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}
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func TestValidateExternalURL_AllowedCIDR(t *testing.T) {
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ctx := context.Background()
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// LAN range allowlist lets a NAS at 192.168.10.50 through.
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opt := request.SSRFOptions{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"192.168.10.0/24"}}
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
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"http://192.168.10.50/share/file.zip", opt))
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// IPs outside the allowlisted CIDR remain rejected.
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err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
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"http://192.168.11.50/share/file.zip", opt)
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assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL)
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// IPv6 ULA allowlist.
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opt = request.SSRFOptions{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"fd00::/8"}}
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
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"http://[fd12:3456::1]/x", opt))
|
||||
|
||||
// Malformed CIDRs are silently dropped without affecting other entries.
|
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opt = request.SSRFOptions{AllowedCIDRs: []string{"not-a-cidr", "10.0.0.0/8"}}
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assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx, "http://10.5.5.5/x", opt))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
func TestValidateExternalURL_Magnet(t *testing.T) {
|
||||
ctx := context.Background()
|
||||
|
||||
// DHT-only magnet (no tracker/web seed) is allowed.
|
||||
assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
|
||||
"magnet:?xt=urn:btih:c12fe1c06bba254a9dc9f519b335aa7c1367a88a",
|
||||
request.SSRFOptions{}))
|
||||
|
||||
// Internal tracker URL is rejected.
|
||||
err := request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
|
||||
"magnet:?xt=urn:btih:abc&tr=http://127.0.0.1:7777/announce",
|
||||
request.SSRFOptions{})
|
||||
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL)
|
||||
|
||||
// Internal web seed is rejected.
|
||||
err = request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
|
||||
"magnet:?xt=urn:btih:abc&ws=http://10.0.0.1/seed",
|
||||
request.SSRFOptions{})
|
||||
assert.ErrorIs(t, err, request.ErrUnsafeURL)
|
||||
|
||||
// Public tracker is allowed.
|
||||
assert.NoError(t, request.ValidateExternalURL(ctx,
|
||||
"magnet:?xt=urn:btih:abc&tr=udp://tracker.opentrackr.org:1337/announce",
|
||||
request.SSRFOptions{}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in new issue